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DRUG LEGALIZATION:





The drug crisis is regular front-page fare.' There is drug- re-
lated anarchy abroad,2 as the cocaine dealers of Colombia declare
war on their government; there is drug-related anarchy of a different
sort at home, as neighborhoods are caught in the crossfire among
drug dealers.' In hospital rooms, crack babies gasp for breath;4
* Lecturer in Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University;
M.P.P. Harvard University, 1977; Ph.D. Harvard University, 1988.
** Consultant on Drug Policy Issues to the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Califor-
nia. A.B. Harvard University, 1988.
1. France, The Drug War: Should We Fight or Switch?, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1990, at 43;
See, e.g., Kerr, Crack Burdening a Justice System, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1986, at Al, col. 5;
Gross, Urban Emergency Rooms: A Cocaine Nightmare, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1989, at Al,
col. 1; French, Crack Filling New York Hospitals with Frustration, Fear and Crime, N.Y.
Times, May 10, 1989, at Al, col. 5; Riding, In War on Coca, U.S. Weapon is Bogged Down in
a Dispute, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1988, at Al, col. 1; James, Murders in Queens Rise 25%;
Crack is Key Factor, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1988, at Al, col. 2.
2. See, e.g., Treaster, Columbians, Weary of the Strain, Are Losing Heart in the Drug
War, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1989, at Al, col. 5.; Brooke, Drug Traffickers In Columbia Start A
Counter Attack, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1989, at Al, col. 6; Kerr, Columbia's Cocaine Lords:
Conviction in U.S. Poses Little Threat To Power, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1988, at 5, col. 1;
Riding, Cocaine Billionaires: The Men Who Hold Columbia Hostage, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8,
1987, § 6 (Magazine), at 27.
3. See, e.g., McKinley, Gunmen Kill 2 Bystanders in 'Power Play Queens Incident
Termed Dealers'Show of Force, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1989, at BI, col. 5; Raab, Brutal Drug
Gangs Wage War of Terror in Upper Manhattan, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1989, at BI, col. 4;
Terry, Bystander, 12, Shot, and Killed in Drug Dispute: Brooklyn Site of Death Known for
Crack Use, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1989, § 1, at 25, col. 1; Madden, Stunned by 3 Killings in 5
Days, Stamford Cites Growing Drug Crisis, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1988, at B4, col. 3. Ordinary
citizens who speak out against the proliferation of drug trafficking in their neighborhoods are
sometimes targets of retribution. See Gross, Drug Shooting Casualty Inspires a City to Resist,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1990, at 9, col. 1; cf. Eulogy for a Drug-War Martyr: Victim's Spouse
Pledges Battle, Newsday, Aug. 11, 1989, at 4, col. 1.
4. See French, Rise in Babies Hurt by Drugs is Predicted, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1989,
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outside, 12-year-old dealers are shot in the street, beepers at their
sides and bankrolls in their pockets.'
The Bush Administration has responded to the increasing inten-
sity of the drug problem with heightened rhetoric6 and proposals for
additional funding.7 Congressional Democrats criticize the program
as being short of the mark and ask for more." At the same time,
some tired veterans of the drug wars-judges,9 prosecutors,10 proba-
at BI, col. 5; see also Bohlen, Number of Mothers in Jail Surge with Drug Arrests, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 17, 1989, at Al, col. 4; Mother Charged in Baby's Death from Cocaine: Illinois
Prosecutor Cites Rise in Similar Cases, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1988, at A18, col. 1.
There has been an increasingly heated controversy surrounding the issue of whether co-
caine-using mothers should be criminally liable when their drug use during pregnancy results
in the deformity or death of their fetus. See, e.g., Roney, Imprison Addicts, for the Children's
Sake, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1989, at 24, col. 1 (Letter); Chavkin, Help, Don't Jail, Addicted
Mothers, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1989, at A21, col. 2.
5. See Drug Trade's Army of 'Crack' Gunmen, Newsday, Mar. 14, 1989, at 4, col. 1
(noting that 130 to 150 young children a month have recently been arrested for dealing drugs);
see also Sack, The Short Life of 'Little Man,' A 14-Year Old Drug Peddler, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 29, 1989, at AI, col. 4; Lewis, Abroad at Home: Dr. Feelgood Prescribes, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 13, 1989, § 4, at 23, col. 1 (observing that "[o]n a street corner in a poor neighborhood
of New York, a 12-year-old boy sits on a milk crate and sells crack. His mother stands by,
patting his head. Other boys, as young as 7, 8 and 9, hang out nearby. They have most of the
crack to be sold, so the 12-year-old will not be caught with it in his possession."). See gener-
ally T. WILLIAMs, THE COCAINE KIDS (1989) (portraying the daily lives of eight teenage co-
caine dealers in New York City over the course of four years).
6. See OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POL'Y, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY (1989) [hereinafter BENNETI PLAN] (noting that
"[crack] ... is an acid that is fast corroding the hopes and possibilities of an entire generation
of disadvantaged young people. They need help. A decent and responsible America must fully
mobilize to provide it.").
7. On September 5, 1989, President Bush announced his Administration's new drug plan
in a televised speech. The plan, popularly known as the "Bennett Plan", proposes a $7.9 billion
drug-war budget for Fiscal Year 1990, a $2.2 billion increase over last year's budget. See
BENNETT PLAN, supra note 6, at 113.
8. See Sirica, Bush Targets Casual Users, Sets Billions Against Drugs, Newsday, Sept.
6, 1989, at 5, col. 1 (Sen. Joseph P. Biden (D. Del.) arguing that the Bennett Plan budget
increases spending for the war on drugs, in real terms, by only $716 million); Money Bush
Wants for Drug War is Less than Sought by Congress, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1989, at Al, col.
4. Congressional Democrat's primarily attacked the Bennett Plan by arguing that the plan
failed to devote enough resources to drug education, prevention, and treatment. See, e.g., Le-
galization of Illicit Drugs: Impact and Feasibility, Part I. Hearing Before the Select Commit-
tee On Narcotics Abuse and Control, House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 86-88
(1988) (Statement of Cong. Charles B. Rangel (D. N.Y.) Chairman). The Bennett Plan pro-
poses approximately $617 million budget for drug prevention and education programs, BEN-
NETT PLAN, supra note 6, at 115, whereas a recently released drug plan prepared by Senator
Joseph P. Biden proposes $1.135 billion for drug education in Fiscal year 1990. Berke, Bennett
Doubts Value of Drug Education, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1990, at 1, col. 2.
9. See, e.g., Speech by Robert Sweet, United States District Court Judge of the South-
ern District of New York, before the Cosmopolitan Club in New York City (Dec. 12, 1989),
reprinted in LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 18-25, 1989, at 20-21.
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tion and juvenile officers,", and even an occasional police of-
ficer' 2 -say quietly (and for the most part off the record) that drug
prohibition has failed and a new course is needed. They are sup-
ported by academics, economists,1 3 journalists, physicians, 4 law-
yers 1 5 and a small number of elected officials' 6 who have publicly
raised the issue of drug legalization.
The term "legalization," as used in the current debate, covers a
wide variety of proposals. While complete legalization would make
any psychoactive substance available to any willing buyer,most advo-
cates of legalization would limit legal availability to adults, 17 and
10. See, e.g., Coyle, Prosecutors Admit: No Victory In Sight, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 8, 1988,
at S2-$3.
11. See, e.g., Smyley, A Lot Better Than Jail Time, Newsday, July 5, 1988 (New York
City Probation Commissioner Kevin T. Smyley discussing the increased need for reliance on
rehabilitation as an alternative to incarceration with respect to drug offenders).
12. See The Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Feb. 13, 1990) (video tape on file
at Hofstra Law Review) (Ralph Salerno, former Chief of Detectives in the Organized Crime
Bureau of the New York City Police Department, criticizing the Bennett Plan on several
grounds and advocating legalization).
13. See, e.g., Friedman, An Open Letter to Bill Bennett, Wall St. J., Sept. 7, 1989, at
A16, col. 2.
14. See, e.g., Jonas, Solving the Drug Problem: A Public Health Approach to the Re-
duction of the Use and Abuse of Both Legal and Illegal Recreational Drugs, 18 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 751 (1990); Gelman, City Doc: Drugs Should Be Legal, Newsday, July 25, 1989, at 19,
col. I (Dr. Kildaire Clarke, Associate Medical Director of the emergency room at Brooklyn's
Kings County Hospital, calling for legalization).
15. See, e.g., King, A Worthless Crusade, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 1, 1990, at 4-5 (Editorial).
Rufus King, a Washington lawyer who has written extensively on drug-law reform and served
on several congressional investigations, observes that "[i]t took the nation only 13 years to
recognize that Prohibition had been a disastrous mistake. Isn't it about time, after all these
decades of folly and failure, that we open our eyes to the realities of this mistake too? Let's
hear it for legalization!" Id.
16. The most prominent politician to have publicly endorsed legalization is Baltimore
Mayor Kurt Schmoke. See Schmoke, An Argument in Favor of Decriminalization, 18 HoF-
STRA L. REV. 501 (1990). In April, 1988, at a meeting of the United States Conference of
Mayors, Schmoke proposed that Congressional hearings be held to consider legalization. See
Kerr, The Unspeakable is Debated: Should Drugs Be Legalized?, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1988,
at Al, col. 1 (noting that Schmoke's proposal was supported by Minneapolis Mayor Donald
Fraser, Rep. Fortney H. Stark (D. Cal.), and Rep. Stony H. Hoyer (D. Md.)). Legalization
advocates maintain that many more public officials share their views, but remain silent because
they fear the political repercussions of publicly supporting the legalization movement. See
France, supra note 1, at 43; Nadelmann, The Case For Legalization, 92 PUB. INTEREST 3
(1988); see also Schultz on Drug Legalization, Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 1989, at A16, col. 4, col.
5 (former Secretary of State George P. Schultz stating that "we're not really going to get
anywhere until we can take the criminality out of the drug business and the incentives for
criminality out of it.").
17. See Schmoke, supra note 16, at 525; Friedman, supra note 13 (stating that
"[d]ecriminalization would not prevent us from treating drugs as we now treat alcohol and
tobacco: prohibiting sales of drugs to minors, outlawing the advertising of drugs and similar
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apply the new policy to only some of the currently illicit sub-
stances. 8 The term "legalization", however, is also used to describe
the idea that addicts with established drug habits should have legal
access to psychoactive drugs through clinics.' 9 Advocates of
"decriminalization" would keep distribution illegal, but end the ar-
rests of consumers. 20
An undifferentiated debate over "legalization" tends to blur
these distinctions .2 Nonetheless, since the current debate takes place
largely in generic terms, and since some of the arguments apply to a
wide range of possible "legalizations," this Article will conform to
convention and begin by discussing the generic issues.
II. THE ARGUMENTS
Ethan Nadelmann, a prominent advocate of legalization, asks
his readers to compare today's commerce in licit tobacco to the state
of the world if the production, sale and possession of tobacco were
made illegal.22 As millions of newly criminal nicotine addicts
searched for ways to feed their addiction, black-market dealers
would take over.23 Revenue which now flows to the states as ciga-
rette excise taxes would, instead, feed the coffers of criminal organi-
zations.24 A large, expensive and corruptible "Tobacco Enforcement
Administration" would need to be created.2 5 Courts would be
clogged with users caught with tobacco, and with dealers caught sell-
ing it to them.26 The nation would suddenly confront a daunting,
dangerous, and expensive "tobacco problem."
Nadelmann, and other proponents of drug legalization, contend
that this allegory of illicit tobacco closely resembles the reality of
illicit drugs. Their argument rests on the proposition that the social
costs of prohibiting some drugs, and enforcing that prohibition, ex-
measures.").
18. See A. TREBACH, THE HEROIN SOLUTION 267-95 (1982).
19. See id. at 85-116.
20. See infra notes 172-81 and accompanying text (discussing the parameters of
decriminalization proponents).
21. See infra notes 79-94 and accompanying text.
22. Nadelmann, supra note 16, at 12-13.
23. Id. at 12.
24. Id. at 12-13. (estimating that federal and state governments currently earn almost
ten billion dollars per annum in tobacco taxes). These criminal organizations would wage
bloody fights over turf and markets, leading to a startling increase in "[t]obacco-related
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ceeds the value of the goals which that prohibition achieves (i.e., the
social cost it avoids). Such arguments maintain that making
psychoactive drugs illegal simply creates a dangerous and menacing
black market 29 without significantly diminishing the quantity con-
sumed.2 9 On this view, legalization would make the streets safer, put
the black-market dealers out of business, and focus attention on the
medical problem of addiction rather than the legal problem of drug
dealing.30
In reply, supporters of existing prohibitions contend that the
benefits of prohibition justify its costs.31 Some of these supporters
claim that safer neighborhoods and lower law enforcement budgets
would not balance the damage to the public health and well-being
that increased consumption of legal drugs would create.32 Others
hold that the damage done by prohibition is not as significant as
legalization advocates assert.33
On this level, the argument between advocates and opponents of
legalization involves different predictions about the results of alter-
native policies and different value weightings of those results. For
example, legalizers are likely to stress crime reduction, 4 whereas
27. See Nadelmann, supra note 16, at 11-29 (comparing the costs associated with the
war on drugs with the benefits of legalization); Ostrowski, The Moral and Practical Case For
Drug Legalization, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 607, 641-79 (1990); see also France, supra note I, at
46 (quoting Kevin B. Zeese, a criminal-defense attorney and Vice President of the Drug Policy
Foundation, who cites many of the social costs associated with drug prohibition).
28. Friedman, supra note 13 (noting that "[i]llegality creates obscene profits that fi-
nance the murderous tactics of the drug lords; illegality leads to the corruption of law enforce-
ment officials; illegality monopolizes the efforts of honest law forces so that they are starved for
resources to fight the simpler crimes of robbery, theft and assault.").
29. See Schmoke, supra note 16, at 505 (arguing that "by eliminating access to legiti-
mate sources for drugs, prohibition has virtually ensured the continued profitability of the
illicit drug and an ample supply of illicit drugs for the addicts."); Friedman, supra note 13, at
A16, col. 2 (noting that "the problem is demand, but it is not only demand, it is demand that
must operate through repressed and illegal channels.").
30. Id.
31. Wilson & Dilulio, Crackdown: Treating the Symptoms of the Drug Problem, NEW
REPUBLIC, July 10, 1989, at 21-22; Moore, Actually Prohibition Was a Success, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 6, 1989, at A21, col. 1.
32. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 16, at I (stating that "[m]ost politicians and policy mak-
ers still regard the abandonment of anti-drug laws as dangerous apostasy ... [and] say the
losses would far outweigh the gains").
33. See Moore, supra note 31, at A21, col. 1-2 (noting that violent crime did not in-
crease sharply during Prohibition and that organized crime pre-dated Prohibition, and merely
became more visible during Prohibition).
34. See Hamill, The Great American Drug Muddle, LEAR'S, March 1990, at 156, 156-
1990]
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prohibitionists would emphasize the protection of users' health. 5 But
both sides can agree that policies are to be judged by their predict-
able consequences, and that the balance of advantage ought to deter-
mine the choice. Drugs ought to be prohibited if, and to the extent
that, the benefits of prohibition outweigh its costs.
It is important to note that this debate about the consequences
of alternative drug policies is not the only debate about legalization
taking place. Legalization is also urged, and deplored, for reasons of
principle not directly reducible to results, by those who see them-
selves as guardians of liberty on the one hand and of virtue (or
"traditional values") on the other. This second underlying debate,
whose protagonists we will call "libertarians" and "cultural conserv-
atives," is not about likely consequences, but about the fundamental
rights of the individual against the state, and about the nature of the
good life. 6
The first consequentialist debate over policies and their results
and the second debate over societal values and moral principles ad-
mit distinct sorts of arguments. Assertions about the likely results of
any given drug policy are largely irrelevant to positions rooted in
abstract notions of what is "good" and "right". Similarly, arguments
about the role of the state and what constitutes a good society add
little to a practical discussion about how to reduce drug overdose
deaths and drug-driven crime.
Both sorts of arguments can contribute to our understanding of
what is at stake in formulating and enforcing drug policy. However,
in the contention over legalization, the two debates are being waged
simultaneously, often in the same forums, and poorly distinguished
from one another.
This confusion helps account for the peculiar fury which has
attached itself to the legalization question.3 7 A purely consequential-
35. Kaplan, Taking Drugs Seriously, 92 PUB. INTEREST 32, 34 (1988) (noting that "the
legalization of [drug use] produces an increase in the behavior, which can produce a public-
health problem of enormous magnitude."). But see Schmoke, supra note 16, at 519 (urging
that "[clomprehensive new drug treatment programs, funded with tax dollars saved from dis-
mantling the massive drug law enforcement bureaucracy, would [] provide a humane response
to any increase in the drug using population.").
36. See generally J. BAKALAR & L. GRINSPOON, DRUG CONTROL IN A FREE SOCIETY 1-
34 (1984) (discussing the relationship between individual liberty and drug control).
37. The vehement and caustic debate on drug policy, and the sharp division between
libertarian proponents of legalization and cultural-conservative opponents, has drawn parallels
to the embittered debate on Vietnam between the "hawks" and the "doves" that took place
over 20 years ago. See France, supra note 1, at 43 (comparing the Vietnam debate and the
drug debate in that "each side believes the issue is of transcendent social significance and
[Vol. 18:527
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ist debate over legalization-over the plausibility of alternative pre-
dictions and the weights to be assigned to competing goals-could be
conducted with no more passion than the debate over any other com-
parably complicated social-policy question. In a debate over princi-
ple, however, any assertion that some course of action has an advan-
tage is often taken as being equivalent to an endorsement of that
course of action. Whoever asserts that the free legal availability of
cocaine would likely increase the number of chronic heavy users is
likely to find himself attacked by libertarian proponents of legaliza-
tion as favoring a police state.38 Whoever asserts that drug prohibi-
tions tend to increase the rate of predatory crime will be accused by
cultural-conservative opponents of legalization of indifference to the
personal and social degradations of a life spent under the influence. 39
Thus, the first step in understanding the legalization question is
to disentangle the two debates.40 The consequentialist arguments,
pro and con, have already been sketched. 41 The debate about liberty
and virtue requires some elaboration.
The "libertarian" position holds that the use of mind-altering
substances is never a proper subject of public policy and should al-
ways be left to individual choice.42 It is the right of each adult to
make that choice, and it is unjust for the state to interfere.43
Thomas Szasz's Ceremonial Chemistry, the most consistent
statement of the libertarian position on drug control, contends that
drug use is not rationally distinguishable from dangerous sports and
other activities.44 Libertarians would consider drug controls illegiti-
mate, even if drugs were much more dangerous than sports; but
Szasz offers the stringent control of drugs and not football as evi-
dence that drug laws serve a social function other than protecting
invokes highly charged moral principles in defense of its position.").
38. Cf. Hamill, supra note 34 at 162 (stating that continuing the drug ban "will lead
inevitably to the creation of a vast archipelago of drug gulags ... and more and more young
people firing machine guns from the heart of darkness.").
39. Wilson & Dilulio, supra note 31, at 22; see also Wilson, Against the Legalization of
Drugs, COMMENTARY, Feb. 1990, at 21-28.
40. For a parallel analysis of the two debates about AIDS policy, see Kleiman, AIDS,
Vice, and Public Policy, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 315 (1988).
41. See supra notes 20-33 and accompanying text.
42. See generally T. SZASZ, CEREMONIAL CHEMISTRY (rev. ed. 1985).
43. See generally R. Nozick, ANARCHY. STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
44. Id.; cf. J. BAKALAR & L. GRINSPOON, supra note 36, at 14-16, 27, 30-31, 146-48
(examining the reasons why dangerous drugs are prohibited but dangerous sports, such as
mountain climbing, are. legal).
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citizens from an especially grave threat to their well-being.45
Szasz also argues convincingly that drug regulation has many of
the procedural consequences generally associated with the enforce-'
ment of heresy laws.46 The role that drugs and drug-testing play in
political campaigns, 47 praise for those who denounce others (includ-
ing members of their families) as users and dealers,48 the severity of
punishment 9 and factually incorrect anti-drug propaganda 50 -all
suggest that we have created for drugs many of the same structures
that surrounded heresy-hunting. 51
Szasz defends the libertarian position in terms entirely foreign
45. T. SZASZ, supra note 42, at 79; see infra note 53; cf. Aaron & Musto, Temperance
and Prohibition in America: A Historical Overview, in ALCOHOL AND PUBLIC POLICY: BE-
YOND THE SHADOW OF PROHIBITION 163 (M. Moore & D. Gerstein eds. 1981) (noting this
phenomenon with respect to alcohol Prohibition) [hereinafter SHADOW OF PROHIBITION].
46. T. SZASZ, supra note 42, at 61-74. Szasz compares the Popes' view "that witches
were the transcendent malefactors of the society" with politicians who "have similarly con-
vinced people that drug pushers are the transcendent malefactor of our society and that they
therefore deserve merciless punishment." Id.; see also P. MANNING, THE NARCS' GAME: OR-
GANIZATIONAL AND INFORMATIONAL LIMTS ON DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT 253 (1980) (argu-
ing that "from a social point of view, [drug enforcement is] a ceremony that celebrates what
the powerful segments of society consider appropriate levels and kinds of drug use, proper
styles of life and occupations, the correct place to live, and moral commitment.").
47. See, e.g., Saletan, Jar Wars: From Kissing Babies to Pissing in Bottles, NEW RE-
PUBLIC, Oct. 2, 1989, at 13-14 (criticizing the fact that "[d]rug testing has become almost a
standard part of political campaigns.").
48. See Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition in the United States: Costs, Consequences and
Alternatives, 245 Sci. 943 (1989); Mailing in the Gossip, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1989, at 6
(reporting on a cut-out coupon recently run in Iowa newspaper asking people to write the
names of anyone in the neighborhood who they suspect is using or dealing drugs, and to return
the coupon to police).
49. See Fitzgerald, Dispatches From the Drug War, COMMON CAUSE MAG., Jan./Feb.
1990, at 13-19. The recent expansion of federal mandatory sentences for drug offenders,
whereby judges can not use discretion in a specific case, has not gone without criticism:
Mandatory minimum sentences, with no possibility of parole .... are symbolic of
the tendency of Congress and the Bush Administration to seek quick, simple solu-
tions to a complex drug problem. Such sentences are supposed to curb drug use and
drug dealing by increasing the certainty of punishment ... but they will do neither.
The outlook instead is for engorged prisons and courts for years to come, and a
virtual certainty that resources at the levels needed won't be available to counsel
people on drugs and treat addiction.
Id. at 15; see also BENNETT PLAN, supra note 6, at 7 (arguing that "any significant relaxation
of drug enforcement-for whatever reason, however well-intentioned-would promise more
use, more crime, and more trouble for desperately needed treatment and education efforts."
(emphasis in original)).
50. See, e.g., N. ZINBERG, DRUG, SET, AND SETTING: THE BASIS FOR CONTROLLED IN-
TOXICANT USE 3 (1964) (noting that studies in the 1960's tended to incorrectly equate occa-
sional and moderate use of illicit drugs as abuse).
51. See T. SZASZ, supra note 46.
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to Nadelmann's.5 2 The number of corrupt officials or the size of the
judicial backlog caused by drug control are irrelevant; drug control
is prima facie an illicit activity. Szasz would oppose prohibition as
much if the hypothetical "Tobacco Enforcement Administration"
were a lean and efficient bureaucratic tiger as he would were it
bloated and corrupt.
Similarly, cultural-conservative opponents of drug legalization
tend to consider the use of the currently prohibited drugs as a vice
which must be forbidden even if it cannot be suppressed, to express
social repudiation of that which degrades human life. They under-
stand drug use to be very different from dangerous sports, providing
only a spurious pleasure which threatens personal autonomy and the
capacity for self-control. 4 Cultural conservatives differ about
whether the vice in question is intoxication or addiction, and about
which drugs belong on the forbidden list, but tend to cluster around
a defense of the legal status quo, with alcohol and tobacco still legal
and heroin, cocaine and marijuana still banned. 55
From the cultural-conservative viewpoint, black market crime
and official corruption are unfortunate side effects of a duty which
the government is nevertheless obligated to discharge. To use such
side-effects as an excuse to avoid drug control would be to sidestep
obligations the state owes its citizenry.5 6
This position has a prominent place in the official defense of
current drug policy. According to the first National Drug Control
52. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
53. See infra note 54-57; Lawn, The Issue of Legalizing Illicit Drugs, 18 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 703 (1990) (arguing against legalization from the viewpoint that drugs, not drug laws,
are the problem); cf Kaplan, supra note 35, at 36 (observing that John Stuart Mill's "simple
principle" of letting each person decide for himself cannot be applied to self-harming conduct
such as drug use).
54. The cultural conservatives could find support for this assertion in Aldous Huxley's
dystopic tale of a Brave New World, where the society lived on "soma." The substance first
appeared to be a harmless pleasure drug; in fact, it was a sinister opiate that ultimately de-
stroyed individual autonomy and eliminated effective human choice. See generally A. HUXLEY,
BRAVE NEW WORLD (1946).
55. See, e.g., Never Trust Anyone Under 40, PoL'Y REV. (Spring 1989).
56. Wilson & Dilulio, supra note 31, at 21-22.
There is an obvious moral reason for attempting to discourage drug use: the heavy
consumption of certain drugs ravages human character .... The pleasure or obliv-
ion [drugs] produce leads many users to devote their lives to seeking pleasure or
oblivion, and to do so regardless of the cost in ordinary human virtues, such as
temperance, duty, and sympathy. The dignity, autonomy, and productivity of users
is at best impaired, at worst destroyed.
1990]
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Strategy, prepared by the Office of National Drug Control Policy
under "Drug Czar" William Bennett: "drug use degrades human
character, and a purposeful, self-governing society ignores its peo-
ple's character at great peril. Drug users make inattentive parents,
bad neighbors, poor students, and unreliable employees .... [Using
drugs is] a hollow, degrading, and deceptive pleasure, .... and pursu-
ing it is an appallingly self-destructive impulse."
'57
It is from this perspective that the ritual denunciation of legali-
zation in statute and official pronouncement can be seen to make
sense. The act of denunciation reaffirms the values perceived to be at
stake. The a priori commitment of the government-funded research
community to "prove ... drugs' potential for harm" is also part of
this pattern. 8
The libertarian proponents of legalization and their cultural-
conservative opponents do a public servide by reminding us of the
matters at stake in the drug-policy arena which a casual review of
"consequences" might ignore. The libertarians point out the fallibil-
ity of majorities, in particular their likely over-eagerness to take
their own preferences as the sole measure of the good life. The cul-
tural conservatives make the point that the economists' myth of the
rationally maximizing consumer corresponds only imperfectly with
the real social world, and that over-indulgence in intoxicants is as
old, and as consistent, as intoxicant use itself. 9 While the libertari-
ans remind us of why drug policy is dangerous, the cultural conserv-
atives remind us of why drug policy is necessary.
But each position, considered in isolation from the other and
from the facts, proves too much to be a useful guide to policy. Cul-
tural conservatives have labelled addiction and intoxication as the
real enemy. If this is true, why not ban nicotine and alcohol or even
chocolate? 60 Why stop with things taken into the body, while leaving
57. BENNETT PLAN, supra note 6, at 7, 9.
58, N. ZINBERG, supra note 50, at 199.
59. Schelling, The Intimate Contest for Self-Command, 60 PUB. INTEREST 94, 96
(1980) ("How should we conceptualize this rational consumer ... who in self-disgust grinds
his cigarettes down the disposal swearing that this time he means never again to risk orphan-
ing his children with lung cancer and is on the street three hours later looking for a store that's
still open to buy cigarettes ... [?]").
60. See A. WEIL & W. ROSEN, CHOCOLATE TO MORPHINE 9-21 (1983). The definition
of "drug" is not as clear as many would have us believe:
Most people would agree heroin is a drug. It is a white powder that produces strik-
ing changes in the body and mind in tiny doses. But is sugar a drug? Sugar is also a
white powder that strongly affects the body, and some experts say it affects mental
function and mood as well. Like heroin it can be addicting. How about Chocolate?
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aside entertainments, spectacles and arguments, which, as Plato's
Socrates points out, enter directly into the soul?6' Pornography must
obviously go, and graphic violence and mindless cartoons for chil-
dren; rock concerts come up close behind, along with television-
watching generally and spectator sports more specifically. 2 All can
be, and have been, plausibly described as spurious and degrading
pleasures and as sources of addiction. 3 The problem, then, is to
draw a dividing line between those alleged vices which can be left
freely available and those for which public control is so strongly re-
quired that the (usually heavy) costs of coercive intervention are jus-
tified. Answering such line-drawing questions requires that cultural
conservatives study closely the facts about the actual harms done by
various candidate vices across a variety of devotees and about the
effectiveness and the unwanted side-effects of prohibiting those vices.
By the same token, libertarians need to explain why, if twelve-
year-olds are allowed to buy Coca-Cola, they should be forbidden to
buy cocaine. They also need to decide whether a mother who spends
her money on legal crack instead of baby food is exercising her own
liberty or impeding the liberty of her child. In answering these ques-
tions (and their sequels), they too will be drawn into the consequen-
tialist snare.
In fact, many people of both libertarian and cultural- conserva-
tive leanings make concessions to consequences. Some "libertarians"
have come to accept John Stuart Mill's willingness to "forego any
advantage.., from the idea of abstract right as a thing independent
of utility." '64 They advocate largely free access to drugs as a practi-
Most people think of it as a food or flavor, but it contains a chemical related to
caffeine, is a stimulant, and can also be addicting. Is salt a drug? Many people
think they cannot live without it, and it has dramatic effects on the body.
Id. at 9.
61. PLATO: THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES 624-25, 312-13 (E. Hamilton & H. Cairns eds.
1985).
62. See J. BAKALAR & L. GRINSPOON, supra note 36, at 24 (noting that Plato believed
music and sex ought to be regulated by the government).
63. See T. SzAsz, supra note 42, at xiii (stating that in modern society, the term " 'ad-
diction' refers not to a disease but to a despised kind of deviance."). In recent years, the
definition of "addiction" has been expanded far beyond its traditional meaning of physical
dependence on a drug. Levine, America's Addiction to Addictions, U.S. Naws & WORLD
REP., Feb. 5, 1990, at 62. Many experts now view addiction as "any pleasurable behavior that
turns out compulsive," ranging from shopping and eating to promiscuity and gambling. Id.
Levine described a case where a Vietnam veteran accused of drug running even went so far as
to claim an uncontrollable addiction to "action". Id. at 63. The jury acquitted the veteran
after a defense expert testified that the vet was a victim of "action-addict syndrome." See id.
64. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 16 (1954).
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cal rather than principled option, and their legalization proposals are
often accompanied by practical caveats.6 5 Some cultural conserva-
tives, though committed to an anti-drug ethic, allow the factual
dimensions of a given drug problem to determine how that ethic
should be practiced.
This Article embraces the consequentialist calculus of costs and
benefits. It assigns neither peculiar moral status to liberty nor pecu-
liar moral onus to intoxication. Instead, it treats each as a sort of
cost, worth considering in determining which sorts of drug policy are
likely to have the best results-that is, which policies minimize the
total costs of use and prohibition.
This sort of argument requires both analysis and evaluation. It
must both identify the probable consequences of a range of possible
policies, and suggest which bundles are "better" and which are
"'worse."
Neither the analysis nor the evaluation is straightforward. Like
other major social problems, the drug problem has costs that resist
quantification and even description. Costs range from the obvious
and the assignable-lung cancer deaths, 66 dealer violence---to
problems to which drugs may or may not contribute, such as the
weakening of the traditional family structure or the undermining of
the woik ethic.68 Comparing these costs is even more difficult. How
much liberty is worth sacrificing to prevent how many drug-related
deaths? How much drug intoxication would be accepted to empty
ten percent of the prison cells?
This Article's critique of legalization proposals downplays the
problem of what weights to assign different kinds of harm. Instead,
it emphasizes the analytic side of the problem, identifying the proba-
ble consequences of various policies. Thus the close evaluative ques-
tions, with important values on both sides, are left unanswered.
The role of analysis is to lay out the selection of outcomes actu-
65. See, e.g., A. TREBACH, supra note 18, at 272-73 (1982). Trebach, who advocates
inclusion of heroin in the legitimate medical pharmacopeia but believes in continued general
prohibition, raises libertarian concerns even as he argues for a severely limited legalization.
See generally id.
66, See, e.g., M. KLEIMAN, MARIJUANA 8-9 (1989) (discussing the physical effects of
smoking marijuana as compared with cigarette smoking); Wu, Tashkin, Djahed & Rose, Pul-
monary Hazards of Smoking Marijuana as Compared with Tobacco, 318 N. ENG. J. MED.
347, 347 (1988).
67. See sources cited supra note 3.
68. See Wilson & Dilulio, supra note 31, at 22 (noting that "heroin addict[s] ... [or]
crack smoker[s] . . . are not likely to be healthy people, productive workers, good parents,
reliable neighbors, attentive students, or safe drivers.").
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ally available by predicting the consequences of alternative policies.
The consequences are not always intuitively obvious; and some of the
more desirable outcomes may simply not be available.
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE CASE FOR LEGALIZATION
A central accomplishment of the consequentialist proponents of
legalization has been to stress the vital distinction between the costs
of drug abuse and the costs of drug control. Drug use is one prob-
lem. It makes some users sicker, poorer, more dangerous, and less
responsible. On the other hand, state control of drug use creates dif-
ferent problems: crowded prisons, unsafe neighborhoods, wealthy
criminal consortia, corrupt officials.6 These problems should not be
confused; prison overcrowding should not be treated as if it were a
pharmacological result of cocaine use.
Equally important, legalization advocates have refused to treat
currently legal drugs as conceptually distinct from currently illegal
ones. Alcohol and tobacco, like marijuana and heroin, are drugs with
significant costs of abuse and costs of control." Tobacco is an impor-
tant special case: addictive and health damaging. But the rhetoric of
the "war on drugs" attempts to obscure this fact, as if there were
chemical categories of "legal" and "illegal" drugs. Reminding us to
treat alcohol and tobacco as drugs, in both explanatory and compar-
ative contexts, is therefore an important service.
Current consequentialist arguments for legalization, however,
suffer from grave weaknesses. First, they fail to specify crucial de-
tails of potential legal regimes.7 Second, they underestimate the role
of prohibition in reducing the extent of drug abuse.7 2 Third, they fail
to recognize or acknowledge many of the likely unwanted side effects
of legalization."
Finally, too few legalization advocates have gone beyond dis-
cussing the costs of drug control to ask how society might actually
69. See Nadelmann, supra note 16.
70. It is estimated that in 1983, "alcohol abuse cost the United States almost $117 bil-
lion .... Of this amount, nearly $71 billion is attributed to lost employment and reduced
productivity and $15 billion to health care costs." Secretary of Health and Hum. Servs., U.S.
Dep't of Health and Hum. Servs., Sixth Special Report to the U.S. Congress on Alcohol and
Health 43 (1987) [hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT]; see also Nadelmann, supra note 16, at 11-
13; Kerr, supra note 16, at 24, col. 1 (citing a report by the Triangle Institute of North
Carolina that stated that drug abuse cost $60 billion-almost one-half less than alcohol
abuse.).
71. See infra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
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go about legalizing a particular illicit drug or drugs. It is in asking
this question that hidden costs of legalization become apparent.
Therefore, this Article's critique of legalization proceeds in two
ways. The remainder of this section is a general discussion of flaws
in legalization proposals. The final section analyzes the impact of
possible changes in legal status on the American markets for three
drugs: alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine.
A. Defining Legalization
Legalization, like prohibition, does not name a unique strategy.
Perhaps the most prominent inadequacy of current legalization argu-
ments is their failure to specify what is meant by "legalization."
Current drug policy provides an illustration of this diversity.
Heroin and marijuana are completely prohibited,74 and cocaine can
only be used in rigidly specified medical contexts, not including any
where the drug's psychoactive properties are exercised. 5 On the
other hand, a wide range of pain-killers, sleep-inducers, stimulants,
tranquilizers and sedatives can be obtained with a doctor's
prescription."
Alcohol is available for recreational use, but is subject to an
array of controls including excise taxation,7 7 limits on drinking
ages, 78 limits on TV and radio advertising,7 9 and retail licensing.80
Nicotine is subject to age minimums, warning label requirements,8
taxation,82 and bans on smoking in some public places.8 3
74. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841-58 (1988).
75. See id. § 812 (1988) (providing that cocaine is a "Schedule II" controlled sub-
stance); id § 829(a) (providing that a Schedule II substance may be dispensed directly by a
practitioner when determined to be a "prescription drug" under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act); Kaplan, supra note 35, at 35 (observing that the United States already permits
the prescriptions for medical use of cocaine and THC).
76. In 1970, Congress passed the Controlled Substance Act which provides for a govern-
ment-regulated system of dispensing drugs. Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84
Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1988)).
77. See 26 U.S.C. § 5001-5056 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
78. The United States government has, in effect, established a national minimum drink-
ing age of 21 by threatening to withhold federal highway funds from states which fail to
comply. See 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1988). Consequently, most states have established a minimum
drinking age as a matter of state law. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §. 1199(e)
(West Supp. 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-86 (West Supp. 1989); ILL ANN. STAT. ch.
43, para. 131 (Smith-Hurd 1986); N.Y. ALCO. BEy. CONT. LAW § 65.1 (McKinney 1987).
79. See.e.g., 27 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1982); infra note 133.
80. See 27 U.S.C. § 201-11 (1982).
81. 15 U.S.C § 1333 (1988) (requiring stringent warnings on all cigarette packages
about the health dangers of smoking).
82. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 5701-5761 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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Drug legalization can therefore be thought of as moving drugs
along a spectrum of regulated statuses in the direction of increased
availability. However, while legalization advocates do not deny that
some sort of controls will be required, their proposals rarely address
the question of how far on the spectrum a given drug should be
moved, or how to accomplish such a movement. Instead, such details
are dismissed as easily determined, or postponed as a problem re-
quiring future thought.8 4 But the consequences of legalization de-
pend almost entirely on the details of the remaining regulatory re-
gime. The price and conditions of the availability of a newly legal
drug will be more powerful in shaping its consumption than the fact
that the drug is "legal." Rules about advertising, place and time of
sale, and availability to minors help determine whether important
aspects of the drug problem get better or worse. The amount of reg-
ulatory apparatus required and the way in which it is organized and
enforced will determine how much budget reduction can be realized
from dismantling current enforcement efforts. 5
Moreover, currently illicit drugs, because they are so varied
pharmacologically, would not all pose the same range of the
problems if they were to be made legally available for non-medical
use. They would therefore require different control regimes. These
regimes might need to be as diverse as the drugs themselves.
B. Evaluating the Impact of Prohibition
Legalization advocates have pointed out that some costs that
appear to be the costs of drug abuse are in fact costs of its control.8
However, the discovery that prohibition has significant costs appears
to have obscured, for these advocates, its possible benefits.8 7 Some
83. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25940-25949.8 (West 1984 & Supp.
1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 386.201-.209 (West 1986); MAss. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 270, § 22
(Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.414 (1988); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW $ 1399-o to -q
(McKinney Supp. 1988).
84. See Nadelmann, supra note 16, at 6-7.
85. See, e.g., id. at 46-47 (arguing that if marijuana, cocaine, and heroin were legal,
both state and federal governments would collect billions of dollars annually in the form of tax
revenues); Ostrowski, The Moral and Practical Case For Drug Legalization, 18 HOESTRA L.
REV. 607, 643 (1990) (noting that drug prohibition costs the taxpayer an estimated $10
billion).
86. See, e.g., Ostrowski, supra note 85, at 643 (conducting a cost-benefit analysis and
concluding that the most serious problems the public associates with illegal drug use are in
reality caused, directly or indirectly, by drug prohibition).
87. As John Kaplan has noted, "[there is a considerable temptation to conclude without
any ... examination that our present policy is so costly that free availability just has to be
better." J. KAPLAN, THE HARDEST DRUG: HEROIN AND PUBLIC POLICY 110 (1983) (emphasis
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advocates of legalization simply argue that prohibition has no effect
on consumption, and, thus, that legalization can shrink the drug
problem at a stroke by legislating away a whole category of costs. In
short, while illegal drugs have costs of abuse and costs of control,
legal ones would have only costs of abuse.88 Other, more sophisti-
cated accounts simply minimize prohibition's effects.89
However, these assertions fly in the face of research and experi-
ence. Black-market cocaine costs nearly twenty times as much as
legal, "free market" cocaine,90 and it is implausible that a twenty-
fold change in a drug's price would have only a trivial effect on vol-
ume. It is equally implausible that, even holding the price constant,
the convenience and safety of a licit purchase would fail to attract
new customers.9' Prohibition and enforcement make the currently il-
licit drugs more expensive and less available. 2 The same effect is
apparent from the history of alcohol criminalization: Prohibition
clearly decreased consumption, Repeal just as clearly increased it, by
substantial amounts.9
The problem legalization advocates face in accounting for the
in original); see also Moore, supra note 31, at A21, col. I (detailing the various benefits of
alcohol Prohibition and warning against comparing it to drug prohibition.).
88. Friedman, supra note 13, at A14, col. 4; see also sources cited supra note 86.
89. See, e.g., Falco, The Bush Drug Plan: Nothing New, N.Y Times, Sept. 5, 1989, at
A19, col. 3 (criticizing the Bennett Plan's concentration on law enforcement, to which 70% of
the new Federal drug budget is allocated, and noting that there has been "overwhelming evi-
dence accumulated during the past eight years of the minimal impact of law enforcement on
drug abuse and drug trafficking."); Kerr, supra note 16, at 1, col. I; infra note 12 and accom-
panying text.
90. See BENNETT PLAN, supra note 6, at 6 (commenting that while a gram of cocaine
currently sells for $60 to $80, the free market price would be approximately $3 or $4); Kaplan,
supra note 35, at 41 (noting that a gram of cocaine currently sells for $80-$100, while it costs
less than $3 per gram to produce).
91. See BENNETT PLAN, supra note 6, at 6 (arguing that legalization would bring the
price of cocaine "well within the lunch money of the average elementary school student.");
Kaplan, supra note 35, at 42 (arguing that legalizing cocaine is far too risky, because there is
no guarantee that a sharp decrease in price would not result in a sharp increase in use); id at
41 (noting that if the retail price of a gram of cocaine were $20, the cost of a "hit" would be
about forty cents, making it affordable and convenient even for school-age children).
92. See Reuter & Kleiman, Risks and Prices: An Economic Analysis of Drug Enforce-
ment, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 289-310 (M. Tonry & N.
Morris eds. 1986).
93. Mortality from cirrhosis of the liver can be used to measure changes in drinking
volumes. See SHADOW OF PROHIBITION, supra note 45, at 62-63 (citing a 1932 study which
demonstrated that alcohol related illnesses reached the lowest level ever during prohibition);
Kaplan, supra note 35, at 34 (discussing the social benefits and cost of alcohol Prohibition in
the 1930's); accord J. BAKALAR & L. GRINSPOON, supra note 36, at 33 see also Legal or Not,
Drugs Kill, N.Y. Times, May 26, 1988, at A34, col. 1 (noting that although Prohibition
"failed as a social policy, it was a health triumph.").
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effects of prohibition is illustrated by their treatment of alcohol and
tobacco. Correctly, they use the heavy load of damage associated
with the currently licit drugs to point up the arbitrariness, perhaps
irrationality, of the current categorization of drugs into forbidden
and permitted. 4 But unless one thinks that drug policies are made
under Murphy's Law, the fact that the licit substances cause more
health damage than the currently forbidden ones suggests that prohi-
bition tends, on balance, to protect health. From a public health
standpoint, creating a cocaine problem the size of the current alcohol
problem or the current tobacco problem would be a major disaster.
Yet it is far from clear that legal cocaine would be less attractive, or
do less damage to users' health, than alcohol or tobacco. Alcohol and
tobacco are indeed instructive, but they make a point quite opposite
to the one legalization's advocates intend: they demonstrate that le-
gal availability can carry costs at least as significant as those of
prohibition.
C. Legalization: Theory and Practice
Some legalization advocates concede that legalization has po-
tential costs, but urge that the risks are worthwhile since the poten-
tial benefits are great and the risks containable.95 A more lively ap-
preciation of the variety of ways in which legalization might go
wrong, and the high potential price of those malfunctions, might re-
duce the enthusiasm of the legalization camp.
Consider the prohibition of licit drugs to minors. If completely
effective, it would ameliorate many of the consumption-related costs
of legalization. Some legalization advocates simply assume that this
would be the case.' But the actual histories of alcohol and to-
bacco---both nominally forbidden to minors but widely available to,
and used by, adolescents-are far from encouraging on this score.97
94. See, e.g., Nadelmann, supra note 48, at 941 (arguing that alcohol is the drug which
is most "strongly associated with violent behavior."); King, supra note 15, at 4-5 (noting that
licit substances such as alcohol and tobacco cause greater problems than illegal substances).
95. Nadelmann, supra note 48, at 946.
96. See Friedman, supra note 13, at A16, col. 4 (arguing that prohibition cannot per se
be enforced whereas decriminalizing drugs, with the same restrictive measures now imposed on
alcohol and tobacco, would be a workable and enforceable policy).
97. Thirty-one percent of children ages 12-17 report having used alcohol at least once in
the past month; 11.6% report having had at least five drinks at one sitting during this time.
NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE: MAIN FIND-
INGS 1985 at 80, 84 (Office of Health & Human Services Publication No. (ADM) 88-1586,
1988). 42% of male high school seniors report having five drinks in the past month. NAT'L
INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, DRUG USE DRINKING, AND SMOKING: NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS
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The oft-heard plea for legalization "experiments" is similarly
remote from the world of practice. 98 Re-prohibiting a legal drug
would be a much costlier business than continuing to prohibit an
illegal oneY9 The increase in costs would be directly proportional to
the increase in market size brought about by legalization.100 In the
circumstance where reversal would be most called for-an explosion
in consumption-enforcement costs would be greatest and the
probability of a failed re-prohibition highest. As Humpty-Dumpty
demonstrated, not all processes are reversible. While irreversibility is
not itself an argument for the status quo, it is an argument for
caution.
The following case studies consider the details of pricing, availa-
bility and advertising as well as legal status. The costs of repealing
prohibition are treated as seriously as those of imposing and enforc-
ing it. The intention of this Article is not to provide specific policy
recommendations, but to suggest the sort of detailed description and
analysis that a serious legalization debate would require. While this
approach attempts to be constructive, the conclusions are pessimistic.
IV. POSSIBLE LEGALIZATIONS: THREE CASE STUDIES
Much of the popular and scholarly debate on both sides of the
legalization question, like much of the drug policy literature in gen-
eral, treats the nation's drug problem as if it were due to some singu-
lar, indivisible "drug" and treatable by an equally uniform response.
Each drug, however, has its own consumption problem, harming
users and others in different ways and in different degrees. In addi-
FROM HIGH SCHOOL, COLLEGE, AND YOUNG ADULT POPULATIONS 1972-1988 (1989) [herein-
after YOUTH SURVEY].
98. See, e.g., Koshland, The War? The Problem? Experiment? on Drugs, 245 ScI.
1309 (1989) (hypothesizing that "we might institute tough laws for 5 years and then try legal-
ization for another 5 years, collect the data on the two outcomes, and base a final policy on the
results").
99. See L. ENGELMANN, INTEMPERANCE: THE LOST WAR AGAINST LIQUOR Xi-XiV
(1983) (discussing how the eighteenth amendment's prohibition of alcohol was actually a dec-
laration of war, taking its toll on federal, state, and local enforcement, and an alarming num-
ber of innocent bystanders as well); Kaplan, supra note 35, at 33-34 (noting that the cost of
prohibition on the criminal justice system, the feeding of organized crime, official corruption
and civil liberty violations).
100. Nadelmann, who compares black markets in currently illegal drugs to a hypotheti-
cal black market in illegal tobacco, see supra text accompanying notes 22-23, fails to note that
a newly-created tobacco black market would begin with an established consumer base in the
tens of millions; current users of heroin, by contrast, number only in the hundreds of
thousands.
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tion, each has its own market structure and demand patterns. 10 1
This Section examines the legalization question as it applies to
three very different drugs: alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine. Each
case study emphasizes one issue raised by the legalization debate.
The discussion of alcohol emphasizes the value of prohibition as well
as its costs, and the difficulty of creating and maintaining an appro-
priate non-prohibitory regulatory regime.10 2 The analysis of mari-
juana focuses on the importance of adequately defining what is
meant by "legalization. ' 10 3 The discussion of cocaine stresses the dif-
ficulty of setting tax rates for newly legalized drugs and the ubiquity
of unanticipated consequences. 0
A. Legal Alcohol. The Need for a More Grudging Toleration
Drugs that are currently legal provide a convenient set of mod-
els for the legalization debate. Examining licit drug control allows us
to consider real-life, working, regulatory regimes, rather than the
artists' sketches now passing as legalization proposals. Alcohol pro-
vides a superb example of legalization gone awry. Regulations gov-
erning alcohol, the nation's premier recreational psychoactive, are
fantastically permissive, measured against either the rules for other
drugs or benefit-cost criteria.
Alcohol is a very dangerous drug. Had Congress failed to spe-
cifically exempt it from the provisions of the Controlled Substances
Act,10 5 it could be placed along with marijuana and heroin in Sched-
ule I, as a psychoactive drug with no accepted medical use and great
potential for harm. 0 6 Indeed, as a product unsafe in its intended use,
101. Of particular importance are a drug's price elasticity of demand-sensitivity of
consumption to price-and relations of complementarity or substitutability with other drugs.
See Reuter & Kleiman, supra note 92, at 289-96.
102. See infra notes 116-54 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 155-88 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 167-88 and accompanying text.
105. Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified at
21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1988)).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 812 (b)(1) (1988). The Controlled Substances Act establishes five
schedules of substances; the rules and regulations promulgated under the Act vary depending
on the schedule in which a drug is placed. In order to fall within Schedule I, the following
findings with respect to a drug or other substance are required:
(A)The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse.
(B)The drug or other substance has no currently accepted medical use in treatment
in the United States.




it could perhaps be vulnerable to challenge under the Consumer
Product Safety Act.107
When compared with other drugs, casual or experimental alco-
hol users are at significant risk of progressing to heavy, chronic use
or to alcoholic bingeing. 108 An estimated eighteen million Ameri-
cans, out of 140 million total current drinkers, have significant
drinking problems.109 Many of these "problem" drinkers find that
their alcohol use is no longer fully under their deliberate control, and
some of them are the victims of a physical dependency that makes
them actively ill if they do not get a daily ration of their drug-they
are alcohol addicts, alcoholics.' 10 Heavy chronic alcohol use is asso-
ciated with a wide variety of diseases, and alcohol has been esti-
mated to cause approximately twenty thousand excess disease deaths
per year.' More than one-third of all crime leading to state prison
sentences is committed under the influence of alcohol," 2 as is an
even greater proportion of domestic assault, sexual assault, and the
physical and sexual abuse of children, all of which are under-re-
ported and under-punished. 1 3 Tens of thousands die annually and
107. See id.
108. See SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 24. "An estimated 18 million adults 18
years old and older currently experience problems as a result of alcohol use. These problems
may include symptoms of alcohol dependence such as loss of memory, inability to cut down on
drinking, binge drinking, and withdrawal symptoms." Id.
109. Id.; see also Nadelmann, supra note 48, at 943.
110. For a discussion of the logical structure of problem drinking and other compulsive
behavior, see Schelling, supra note 59, at 96-97; see also H. FINGARETTE, HEAVY DRINKING:
THE MYTH OF ALCOHOLISM AS A DISEASE 2-7 (1988) (arguing cogently against the identifica-
tion of all problem drinkers with the disease entity "alcoholism," but failing to demonstrate
that drinking is never compulsive behavior).
Ill, SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 11; see also U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY AND
U,S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., 96TH CONG., 2d Sess., Report to the President and
the Congress on Health Hazards Associated with Alcohol and Methods to Inform the General
Public of These Hazards 1-28 (Comm. Print 1980) (summarizing many of the health hazards
scientifically proven to be associated with alcohol consumption) (hereinafter ALCOHOL RE-
PORT]. Moreover, cirrhosis of the liver, which is a disease primarily attributed to alcohol, is the
sixth most common cause of death in the United States. See Alcohol is No Remedy for Heart
Disease, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1987, at A38, col. 3.
112. BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1986, at 39 (1989) (reporting that 18.5% of prisoners were under the
influence of alcohol at the time of the offense, while another 18.1% were under the influence
of both drugs and alcohol).
113. See Hamilton & Collins, The Role of Alcohol in Wife Beating and Child Abuse: A
Review of the Literature, in DRINKING AND CRIME: PERSPECTIVES ON THE RELATIONSHIP BE-
TWEEN ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 253-67 (J. Collins ed. 1981); see
also NATIONAL COMM. FOR PREVENTION OF CHILD ABUSE. NCPCA FACT SHEET No. 14 (Feb.
1989).
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many more are maimed in alcohol-related traffic accidents, drown-
ings, and fires, including thousands of people who were not drinking
themselves.11 4 Alcohol's contribution to industrial accidents and de-
creased economic productivity is unknown.
One possible conclusion to be drawn from this catalogue of ca-
tastrophes would be that alcohol should be assigned its rightful place
in Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act.115 This is a conclu-
sion with some appeal. But just as the costs of controlling illicit
drugs do not of themselves justify legalization, the extensive damage
caused by alcohol abuse is not, in and of itself, sufficient to justify
re-Prohibition. The costs of criminalizing alcohol would be high;
there are other means of reducing alcohol-related damage; and not
all alcohol users incur, or cause, harm related to their drug use.
Many users testify that they derive pleasure and relaxation from
drinking, that it contributes to sociability, and that they drink
responsibly and behave responsibly while drinking, doing no harm to
others and suffering nothing worse than an occasional hangover . 6
This testimony need not be taken at face value. Drug users can
and do deceive themselves about the damage they incur and the
damage they do to others. However, neither should such testimony
114. "In 1986, there were approximately 46,056 highway deaths of which 23,987 (52.1
percent) were alcohol related." NATIONAL COUNCIL ON ALCOHOLISM AND ALCOHOL RELATED
PROBLEMS (1987) (citing NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS, NAT'L HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FATAL ACCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM
(1986)). Approximately 11,000 non-automobile accidents in 1980 were attributable to alcohol
use. Id.
115. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., ALCOHOL REPORT, supra note I 11, at i (concluding that moderate alco-
hol consumption has been related to reductions in stress, tensions, and coronary disease); Pow-
ell, Treatment and Perceived Blood Pressure Control Among Self-Reported Hyperten-
sives-Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 257 J. A.M.A. 2889, 2890 (1987)
(recognizing that alcohol consumption can be useful in lowering blood pressure); Stampfer,
Colditz, Willett, Speizer & Henneckens, A Prospective Study of Moderate Alcohol Consump-
tion and the Risk of Coronary Disease and Stroke in Women, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 267,
272 (1988) (concluding that moderate consumption of alcohol can have beneficial health ef-
fects); Wilber, Is All Alcohol Equal? The Chemist Say Yes, But the Answers May be More
Complicated, 94 ScI. DIG. 17 (1986) (noting a recent study conducted by the Johns Hopkins
School of Medicine for the Alcoholic Beverage Medical Research Foundation which concluded
that moderate beer consumers appeared healthier than non-consumers, reporting illness 13%
less often); see also Shedle & Block, Adolescent Drug Use and Psychological Health: A Lon-
gitudinal Inquiry, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 612, 612-13 (1990) (showing that adolescents who
had engaged in some drug experimentation, primarily with marijuana, were better adjusted
socially and emotionally than those who had never used drugs or those who used them heavily.
While no causal relationship between some drug use and psychological adjustment is sug-




be ignored. Benefits are an essential part of a cost-benefit calcula-
tion, and consumers-even drug consumers-have information about
benefits. However, an explanation and analysis of the purported ben-
efits of drug use is notably absent from the debate over legalization.
Even if it turned out that the total benefits of alcohol availabil-
ity-the sum of consumers' and producers' surpluses from its use
and sale-were exceeded by its total costs, that alone would not es-
tablish the case for its re-prohibition. It would still have to be shown
that the excess of costs (including black market and enforcement
costs) over benefits would be less under some practicable form of
prohibition than it is now. The larger the existing market, the higher
those added costs of implementing prohibition are likely to be. One
can regret Repeal without wishing to reverse it.
But consider those "other means" of reducing the costs alcohol
imposes on drinkers and others. What are they? To what extent can
they reduce costs while preserving benefits?
Education in schools and communities is an attractive option,
but the evaluation literature is mixed. 17 The most hopeful result is
from a study in Kansas City which found that alcohol use among
sixth and seventh-graders was reduced by half as the result of an
integrated (expensive) drug education program.1 ' If those reduced
rates of early use (delayed ages of onset) translate into lower rates of
later heavy use, that result would be very significant indeed. Longi-
tudinal studies, however, have yet to be done.
While advertising hard liquor is banned in the broadcast me-
dia,1 19 it is advertised freely in magazines and newspapers. Beer and
117. Compare BENNETT PLAN, supra note 6, at 49-53 (stressing the need for education)
with Kaplan, supra note 35, at 42-43 (concluding that education will not do much to lower
drug use), Bush Administration representatives on the National Commission for Drug-Free
Schools have repeatedly resisted including alcohol in anti-drug messages in schools.
118. Kolata, Community Program Succeeds in Drug Fight, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1989,
at 33, col. 1. The study involved 22,500 students in 42 schools in the Kansas City area. Id.
Some schools implemented experimental programs designed to encourage students to resist
using drugs and alcohol, while other schools simply continued their normal programs. Id. at
cols. 2-3. The experimental programs included educational "sessions at school, homework as-
signments that involved role playing with family members about family rules on drug use, and
newspaper articles and television and radio spots on resisting drugs." Id. at col. 3. When asked
about their alcohol use over the course of a month, 4.2% of the students in the experimental
program reported that they had drunk alcohol, whereas 9.4% of the students not in the pro-
gram reported drinking alcohol. Id. at col. 4. Cigarette smoking and marijuana use by students
in the experimental program declined by similar percentages. Id.
119. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms has jurisdiction over alcohol adver-
tising and, pursuant to its authority, has restricted both the content and scope of advertising.
See 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-12 (1988) (empowering the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
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wine advertising is essentially unrestricted. Much of that advertising
appears to be directed at adolescents; this unfortunate fact would not
be easy to alter by legislation. More comprehensive advertising bans
would be of doubtful value in reducing consumption; they might also
deprive consumers of price information, solidifying current market
shares and reducing competition, to consumers' loss. There are also
forms of promotion-such as sponsoring sports events, coupons and
free samples-that a mass-media advertising ban simply cannot
reach.
More promising is negative advertising, which should be di-
rected at all the costs of alcohol use, and not just drunken driving. In
1970, when advertisements for cigarettes were banned from radio
and television,1 0 taking the rare but powerful anti-smoking adver-
tisements with them, cigarette consumption actually increased. 12'
Another way to reduce alcohol-related damage would be to offer
treatment services to those who wanted to quit. But extensive evalua-
tion literature has failed to identify systematic advantages of even
quite rigorous treatment over voluntary self-help through Alcoholics
Anonymous.122 Environmental and demographic factors predict suc-
cess much more strongly than the type of treatment.
123
Mechanisms for seller liability, though perhaps attractive on
moral grounds, are similarly limited in their likely practical ef-
fects. 24 Nor could more draconian restrictions on the time and place
to regulate alcohol advertising). Moreover, several states have enacted even more comprehen-
sive bans on alcohol advertising pursuant to their regulatory power under the twenty-first
amendment. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 561.42(10)-(12) (West 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
41-714 (Supp. 1985); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 138, § 24 (Law Co-op. 1981); Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 67-1-85, 97-31-1 (1972 & Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 516 (West Supp.
1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 32-7-26 to -28 (1986).
120. See 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982) (prohibiting cigarette advertisements on any medium
over which the Federal Communications Commission has jurisdiction); see also Polin, Argu-
ment for the Ban of Tobacco Advertising: A First Amendment Analysis, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV.
99 (1988).
121. See Hamilton, The Demand for Cigarettes: Advertising, the Health Scare, and the
Cigarette Advertising Ban, 54 REV. ECON. STAT., 401, 411 (1972); Warner, The Effects of the
Anti-Smoking Campaign on Cigarette Consumption, 67 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 645, 649 (1977);
see also Polin, supra note 120, at 102 (noting that cigarette companies "perceived the ban as
far preferable to the anti-smoking commercials required by the FCC on stations which ran
cigarette advertisements.").
122. See H. FINGARETTE, supra note 110, at 76-80.
123. See id.
124. See, e.g., Garrison v. Heublein, Inc., 673 F.2d 189, 192 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding
that a manufacturer and distributor of vodka were not liable for failing to warn consumers of
the "common propensities" of alcohol); Pemberton v. American Distilled Spirits Co., 664
S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. 1984) (holding that a manufacturer has no duty to warn consumers of the
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of retail sale be expected to change patterns of use and abuse
significantly.
There may be more promise on the user-accountability side. It
might help if courts and informal mechanisms of social control
stopped accepting alcohol intoxication as a mitigating circumstance
in cases of unpleasant or criminal behavior. One possible sanction for
alcohol-related misbehavior--drunken driving, violent crime or disor-
derly conduct-would be a personal drinking ban, which might be
enforced by routine chemical monitoring.' 25 This approach could
have real promise for alcohol and for other illicit drugs, but there is
no current movement to put it into practice.
The current alcohol control regime purports to ban alcohol use
by children. However, in the absence of vigorous enforcement mea-
sures, "leakage" from older to younger drinkers has made this ban a
paper blockade. Heavy drinking is more common among adolescents,
to whom it is forbidden, than among adults.' 26
Part of this failure lies in enforcement; giving minors alcohol is
not treated, by law or custom, with the harshness ordinarily associ-
ated with dealing drugs to children. But even aggressive enforcement
cannot change the fact that making a drug legal for adults will raise
its availability to minors. Every adult is a potential source of alcohol
for children, and the attractions of the drug are increased by its
identification with being grown-up. Moreover, age restrictions are
not only arbitrary, they are obviously arbitrary-selling a beer to a
dangers associated with alcohol since the dangers of consumption are commonly known); Mor-
ris v, Adolph Coors Co., 735 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (finding no duty on the part of
a beer manufacturer to warn since it is commonly known that excessive consumption may
impair those motor skills necessary to safely operate an automobile). But see Hon v. Stroh
Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510, 516-17 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding that it was not possible to con-
clude, as a matter of law, that the dangers associated with consuming alcohol were commonly
known).
Recently, Congress enacted a statute requiring all alcoholic beverages manufactured, im-
ported or bottled for sale in the United States to contain a warning label. See Alcoholic Bever-
age Labeling Act of 1988, §§ 201-10, 27 U.S.C.A. §§ 213-19a (West Supp. 1989). A conse-
quence of this recent legislation, is that the likelihood of success with seller liability suits has
been further complicated. For a discussion of the Act's effect on both past and future alcohol
warning cases, see Note, The Requisite Specificity of Alcoholic Beverage Warning Labels: A
Decision Best Left for Congressional Determination, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 943 (1990) (au-
thored by George Arthur Davis).
125. Note, however, that such monitoring would be extremely difficult due to alcohol's
simple chemistry, which leaves no distinctive metabolics to be detected in urine.
126. Williams & Vejnoska, Alcohol and Youth: State Prevention Approaches, in
YOUTH AND ALCOHOL ABUSE: READINGS AND RESOURCES 102, 115-16 (C.M. Felsted ed.
1986).
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twenty-year old is a crime, but selling it to him three months later is
licit commerce. This matters because a drinking age, unlike a mini-
mum age for a driver's license, is not self-enforcing. Unless a punish-
ment for reselling alcohol to minors is designed that is severe enough
to deter adults, not so severe as to tie up the courts with cases going
to trial, and obviously appropriate to the crime, heavy leakage across
the age barrier will no doubt continue.
The only regulatory institution now in force which has signifi-
cant potential as a mechanism for controlling alcohol abuse is alco-
hol taxation. Such taxation discourages consumption by making the
drug more expensive, but American alcohol taxes have been declin-
ing in real terms since the Korean War.12 7 Even if the social costs of
crime and costs to the drinkers are excluded, alcohol taxes fall mark-
edly short of the costs to society of alcohol consumption. It has been
estimated by one study that there is an external social cost, exclud-
ing tax, of forty-eight cents per ounce of alcohol, while the average
sale and excise taxes (federal and state) add up to only twenty-three
cents per ounce. 128 Beer, the alcohol product most widely used by
adolescents, is particularly undertaxed, 129 with the result that cheap
beer is less expensive at the retail level than many name-brand soft
drinks.
Alcohol taxes ought to be significantly higher and alcohol in
beer should be taxed as heavily as alcohol in liquor. 30 Fixing the
magnitude of an increase, however, is complex. The costs of raising
taxes include lost consumers' surplus, some redistribution of the total
tax burden toward the poor, and further impoverishment of those
who cannot or do not quit heavy drinking. A very steep tax increase
might also lead to the development of a black market in untaxed
alcohol with attendant costs of enforcement and likely injury caused
by adulterated products.
The central problem with taxation is that it is by nature nondis-
127. See SHADOW OF PROHIBITION, supra note 45, at 71.
128. See Manning, Keeler, Newhouse, Sloss & Wasserman, The Taxes of Sin: Do
Smokers and Drinkers Pay Their Way?, 261 J. A.M.A. 1604, 1608 (1989) (citing DISTILLED
SPIRITS COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLIC REVENUES FROM ALCOHOL BEVERAGES
(1985)).
129. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 5051 (1982).
130. Thomas Schelling makes a vigorous counterargument on the beer-vs-liquor point:
since drunkenness is far more likely to result from imbibing alcohol in concentrated form, tax
discrimination against distilled spirits is rational. Personal Communication with Thomas
Schelling (Jan. 14, 1989). Against this argument must be weighed the role of beer and wine
(particularly wine coolers) in initiating adolescents and even children to alcohol use.
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criminating. In theory, every drink should be taxed according to its
own social costs. Some drinks do no harm, and therefore ought not
be taxed; other drinks impose extraordinary costs, and thus should
be taxed heavily. However, the practical barriers to multiple levels of
taxation are all but insurmountable. Taxation set to cover average
social cost is sure to put too high a price on most use and not enough
on some. Another mechanism is therefore required.
The obvious solution is to prohibit drinking entirely by persons
whose drinking carries social costs above the level set by taxation.
Youthful drinking is not the only type of drinking which causes dis-
proportionate harm. Heavy drinking by anyone, drinking by "com-
pulsive" users (i.e., those whose drinking is no longer under their
deliberate self-control) and drinking by those who commit crimes or
act recklessly while intoxicated all fall into this category.
All of these types of use could be prohibited. Children and those
whose use has led to crime or recklessness could be forbidden from
purchasing alcohol entirely, and there could be an absolute limit as
to the maximum quantity of alcohol anyone could purchase in a
given period. A central database of ineligible purchasers could be
maintained, or, if that proved costly or infeasible, all persons could
be licensed to purchase alcohol as they are to drive, with licenses
revocable for alcohol-related offenses, including resale to unlicensed
individuals.
Such "positive" licensure is an attractive strategy. It could be
conditioned on passing a written test on drinking safety, as is now
done for driving. The drinkers' licenses might be issued in conjunc-
tion with drivers' licenses, and might in fact be the same documents
with different colors. Licensure could allow relatively easy enforce-
ment of personal quantity limits by a system similar to the system
used to keep credit card holders within their credit limits. It could
allow "teetotalers" to identify themselves-and thus, perhaps, to
make themselves eligible for lower auto, life and health insurance
premiums-and it could allow those who wish to become teetotalers
the crutch of tearing up their drinkers' licenses.
But licensure would have its costs as well. A number of practi-
cal problems, some more difficult than others, suggest themselves im-
mediately. State licensing would interfere with interstate travel 31
and, therefore, a national system might be required. The administra-
131. Interstate travel could be affected if one state has a more restrictive licensing sys-
tem than another state. As a result, a citizen of a state which required a license may travel to
a nearby state to purchase alcohol if that nearby state had no license requirement.
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tion of quantity restrictions would require a central computer, and
appropriate safeguards would need to be instituted to protect confi-
dentiality. Everyone, not just young adults, would need to be
"carded" in bars, in liquor stores, and at social functions where alco-
hol was distributed without charge.
Cocktail parties in private homes raise complex regulatory is-
sues. For example, hosts of such parties would need either to "card"
their guests or to know their legal status, and they would need some
waiver of quantity limits to buy enough alcohol for their guests. Em-
ployment discrimination against drinkers might need to be regulated,
or perhaps forbidden in most occupations and required for a few.
Perhaps the most intractable questions involve alcohol use by
pregnant women.' 32 Both of the available regulatory
choices-allowing pregnant women their ordinary alcohol allotment
or denying pregnant women the drinking rights enjoyed by
others-are unappealing, for different reasons.
Finally, licensure would involve significant enforcement costs,
especially because access to alcohol is made, in some cases, inversely
proportional to the motivation for obtaining it. Leakage is sure to be
significant, though its specific features depend on regulatory details.
For example, if personal alcohol limits were high, light drinkers
would have a strong incentive to sell their excess to others at a profit;
if the limits were low, much harmless drinking would be curtailed,
and a black market encouraged.
Despite these problems, a regime consisting of taxation and li-
censure has strong potential to control the costs of alcohol use, in-
cluding the costs of its own enforcement, while maintaining most of
the benefits of legal availability.
This regime departs from the dichotomy which currently gov-
erns American drug control: prohibition or free commerce.' 33 It con-
cedes that the social costs of a flat ban are too great to justify prohi-
bition, but does not replace it with free drug commerce"3 and offers
132. See SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 70, at xxiii, 165-98. Women who drink exces-
sively during their pregnancy can be prosecuted for felony child abuse, even though there
currently is no child abuse statute covering fetuses. See Case Against Pregnant Woman Is
Dismissed, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1990, at t0, col. 3. One of the difficulties in making out a
prima facie case, however, is that injury must exist for abuse to occur and it often takes years
to determine if the fetus was in fact injured by its mother's drinking. See id.
133. See J. BAKALAR & L. GRINSPOON, supra note 36, at 1-34 (discussing the problem
of how a free society should deal with drug use and abuse and balance the interests of health
and safety against the need for individual freedom).
134. Cf. SHADOW OF PROHIBITION, supra note 45, at 63 (noting the importance of mar-
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a middle way, one that might be called "grudging toleration," with
strict controls to decrease consumption and minimize harms.
If the category of "grudgingly tolerated vice" could be success-
fully institutionalized, over time it might provide a framework for
the control of some other licit and illicit drugs. With a working alco-
hol control regime in place, the alcohol problem would be considera-
bly smaller, at which time a proposal to make our marijuana prob-
lem more like our alcohol problem might sound attractive, or at least
more attractive than it does now.
But at the moment, there is no socially recognized category of
"grudgingly tolerated vice," nor are there working models. In the
absence of such models, new legalization regimes are likely to tend
towards the relatively unrestricted availability which characterizes
alcohol. The costs of such availability suggest that those who advo-
cate the legalization of now-illicit drugs might best begin the process
of drug control reform by proposing and testing reforms of current
alcohol policy.
B. Legal Marijuana?-Specifying a Regulatory Regime
If one of the currently illicit drugs had to be chosen for legaliza-
tion, marijuana would be the most obvious candidate.1 35 Indeed,
those who argue in favor of legalizing "drugs" often argue as if ma-
rijuana is the typical case, 31 while opponents of legalization concen-
trate their fire on heroin and cocaine. Several facts combine to make
marijuana prohibition look like a questionable bargain:
-Marijuana is the most widely used of the illicit drugs." 7 An esti-
mated sixty six million Americans have tried marijuana at least
ket regulation to contemporary alcohol policy); Aaron & Musto, supra note 45, at 161 (com-
menting on the "sanctification" of private enterprise which historically accompanied American
alcohol control).
135. See generally L. GRINSPOON, MARIJUANA RECONSIDERED (2d ed. 1977). For a de-
tailed consequentialist analysis of marijuana legalization and decriminalization, see M. KLEI-
MAN, supra note 66.
136. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 35, at 37 (noting that marijuana is the most widely
used illegal drug, the least socially costly, and is "the drug that promises the lowest public
health costs if legalized."); Nadelmann, supra note 16, at 25-26 (claiming that there is little
evidence that occasional marijuana consumption would cause much harm).
137. See NATIONAL INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD
SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE 2-4 (1989) (noting that in a 1988 survey, 25.8 million Americans
used marijuana or hashish in the month prior to the questionnaire submitted) [hereinafter
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY OVERVIEW]; Kerr, supra note 16, at 24, col.1 (commenting that in a
federal survey, 18 million people smoke marijuana at least once a month, 5.8 million people
use cocaine on a monthly basis and there are currently 500,000 regular heroin users in this
country).
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once, and 6.6 million people in this country in 1988 reported that
they use the drug once a week or more. 38 Fewer than three million
Americans, by contrast, have ever tried heroin.1 39
*Despite its prohibited status, marijuana is very easy to obtain. Al-
though there is some evidence of short-term shortages of !ow-po-
tency marijuana, eighty-five percent of high school seniors continue
to report they could get the drug when and if they wanted it. 40
Thus, a substantial fraction of those who would use marijuana if it
were legal are probably using it currently.
*Government expenditures on marijuana enforcement are quite
high. It is estimated that the Federal Government alone has spent
$636 million on marijuana enforcement in 1986.141 Similar calcula-
tions suggest that expenditures in 1988 were $968 million.,42 Thus,
prohibition is expensive.
-Marijuana has by far the lowest ratio of measured harm to total
use of all the illicit drugs. A substantial fraction of all regular ma-
rijuana users become at least daily users for some period of time,
but this becomes a chronic condition for relatively few.143 The most
frightening fact about marijuana is that the number of heavy daily
users, people who spend most of their waking hours under the influ-
ence, is quite large: a few million Americans at any given time.144
But even the existence of this rather obvious "problem" population
must be inferred from data about the drug market rather than be-
ing directly observed in the form of deaths, injuries, crimes 45 or
skid-row personal collapse.' 48 Thus, even if prohibition and enforce-
ment were very successful in reducing marijuana consumption,
questions could still be raised about the benefits of that reduction.
138. HOUSEHOLD SURVEY OVERVIEW, supra note 137, at 3.
139. Id.. But cf. Heroin Comes Back, TIME, Feb. 18, 1990, at 63 (reporting a rise in
heroin use because crack addicts have begun to take heroin to combat the severe depression
that usually follows a crack-induced high).
140. YOUTH SURVEY, supra note 97, at 154 table 27a.
141. M. KLEIMAN, supra note 66, at 156.
142. Id.
143. YOUTH SURVEY, supra note 140, at 31-33.
144. See M. KLEIMAN, supra note 66, at 16-17 (noting that "[t]he three million users at
the top of the marijuana-consumption distribution smoke, on average, five to ten joints per day
apiece, enough to remain intoxicated for most of their waking hours .... ").
145. See Kaplan, supra note 35, at 47 (noting that there have been no allegations that
"marijuana use helps to cause predatory crime, in part because the drug is cheap, in part
because it has a tranquilizing effect.").
146. M. KLEIMAN, supra note 66, at 16-17.
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Marijuana prohibition, then, seems like an expensive, largely in-
effective effort to control a relatively modest problem. It is no won-
der that legalization of marijuana is offered as an obvious and rela-
tively risk-free "first step" in the deployment of legalization. 47
Nevertheless our experience with alcohol should make us skeptical of
claims that any drug legalization is "risk-free." Even the best control
regimes have significant costs, and the control regime that actually
emerges from a legalization process might not be the best one.
Upon reflection, it is not at all clear how legalization could be
expected to reduce the total costs of marijuana abuse and its control.
Consider the following questions:
" What would the price of legal marijuana be?
* At what potency levels would it be available?
* What persons would be permitted to buy the drug?
" What restrictions would be imposed on drug commerce?
• How would the regulatory regime be enforced?
The two most frequently proposed marijuana legalization op-
tions-decriminalization on the one hand148 and regulated commerce
in the legal drug on the other hand' 49-- offer very different answers
to the final three questions above. While both are ostensibly propos-
als for "legalization," these differences make them entirely distinct
policies.
"Decriminalization" would make marijuana possession legal, or,
like traffic violations, only mildly punishable. Import, processing, and
distribution of the drug would retain their illicit status.150 Such a
regime, under which dealers are targeted but users are not, has been
instituted in a number of states1 51 and in the Netherlands.152 It has
147. Nadelmann, supra note 48, at 945 (suggesting that the first step towards reform of
drug policy, legalizing marijuana, is relatively risk-free).
148. See infra notes 150-60 and accompanying text (outlining and discussing the basic
tenets of decriminalization).
149. See infra notes 161-66 and accompanying text (discussing the regulated commerce
alternative).
150. "Decriminalizing" marijuana would place it in the same legal category as alcohol
during Prohibition; legal to have and to use, but not to sell.
151. Eleven states have thus far eliminated incarceration as a penalty for possession or
use of small amounts of marijuana. SEE ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.070 (1989); CAL HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 11357(b) (Supp. 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-18-106(3)(a)-(b) (1986); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2383 (Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.027(3)-(4) (Supp.
1990); MISS. CODE ANN. § 333.7404(d) (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-416(4)-(5) (1989); N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 221.05-.55 (McKinney 1989); N.C. GEN STAT. § 90-95 (Michie 1985); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.03 (Anderson 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4)(f) (1989).
152. See Nadelmann, supra note 16, at 29 (discussing the Netherlands' experience with
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been endorsed by a wide variety.of national organizations153 and, in
a recent National Law Journal survey, by a surprising proportion of
longtime prosecutors.154
The aim of decriminalization is to create enforcement savings
without any great increase in consumption costs. The potential sav-
ings are obvious. The 327,000 people arrested for marijuana posses-
sion in 1988155 would once again be on the right side of the law, and
the extensive investigative and punishment resources now applied to
them-mostly by local jurisdictions--could be used elsewhere.156
It appears unlikely that decriminalization would lead to large
increases in marijuana consumption. 15 7 Both survey evidence and the
experience of decriminalized states suggests that fear of arrest plays
only a modest role in discouraging marijuana use. 158 Since commerce
in the drug would remain forbidden, there would be no reason to
expect major changes in availability or public attitudes. If use were
legal, it might be possible to reduce its best-documented health haz-
ard-lung damage-by encouraging the use of water-filtered smok-
ing devices to replace the ubiquitous "joint."
However, decriminalization also has its costs. A policy which
eliminates one of the deterrents to drug use should be expected to
increase consumption at least minimally.159 By leaving the black
decriminalizing cannabis in the 1970's); Jan van Vliet, The Uneasy Decriminalization: A Per-
spective on Dutch Drug Policy, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 717 (1990) (discussing the Netherlands'
experience with decriminalization); see also Nadelmann, supra note 48, at 944 (noting that
after decriminalization took place in the Netherlands, marijuana use among those aged 15 and
16 decreased from 3% in 1976 to 2% in 1985 and for those aged 17 and 18, marijuana use
decreased from 10% to 5% within a similar period).
153. Bonnie, The Meaning of "Decriminalization". A Review of the Law, 10 CONTEMP.
DRUG PROBS. 277, 278 (1981) (citing the American Bar Association, National Education As-
sociation, American Public Health Association, National Council of Churches, Consumer's
Union and the Governing Board of the American Medical Association); see also Kaplan,
supra note 35, at 38 (discussing a report by the National Academy of Sciences, Committee on
Substance Abuse and Habitual Behavior suggesting that "'current policies directed at control-
ling the supply of marijuana should be strongly reconsidered' ").
154. Coyle, supra note 10, at S2 (surveying 181 chief prosecutors nationwide or their
top drug deputies, and reporting that 25% of the longtime prosecutors voted in favor of
decriminalization of marijuana).
155. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 1988, at 167-68 (1989) (finding that marijuana possession accounted for 28.3% of the
1,155,200 drug abuse arrests in 1988).
156. See Coyle, supra note 10, at S3.
157. See generally Maloff, A Review of the Effects of the Decriminalization of Mari-
juana, 10 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBs. 307 (1981).




market untouched, but making consumption easier, thereby increas-
ing demand, decriminalization benefits black-market marijuana deal-
ers. Rational marijuana traffickers ought to fear legalization above
all things, but they should regard decriminalization as an entirely
good idea. An ingenious middle course, now law in Alaska, 6" allows
the growing and consumption of small quantities at home for per-
sonal use. This presumably reduces the size of the commercial black
market while preserving most of the potential benefits of
decriminalization.
In effect, decriminalization is a proposal for a redistribution of
enforcement costs: it makes user-associated problems smaller and
dealer-associated problems bigger. The balance of advantage is not
self-evident.
Allowing licit commerce would be a vastly different policy. Such
a regime could tax marijuana, license users, limit quantity and po-
tency and so on. It is plausible that such a regime, constructed on
the model of grudging toleration, would have the effect of vastly re-
ducing the enforcement problem, even though this potential benefit is
reduced by the fact that marijuana use is so great among age groups
for whom it would presumably remain illegal under a regulatory re-
gime. Several billion dollars in annual revenue would become availa-
ble to various levels of government, most of it transferred from the
revenues of illicit businesses.
However, legalization could, at the same time, lead to dramatic
increases in consumption. Under prohibition, marijuana is available
to a determined buyer but still far less easy to find and of a less
consistent quality than most legal commodities. Under a regulatory
regime, it would become vastly more available. Buying marijuana
would be as quick and easy as buying a chocolate bar.
Some proponents are likely to reply that any resulting consump-
tion increase would be of little significance. Like occasional and
moderate drinking, occasional and moderate marijuana use is with-
160. In Alaska, possession of less than an ounce of marijuana in public is only punisha-
ble by a fine of no more than $100. ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.070 (1989); see also id. § 11.71.080(providing that "for purposes of calculating the aggregate weight of live marijuana plants, the
aggregate weight shall be the weight of the marijuana when reduced to its commonly used
form."); see also Bonnie, supra note 153, at 278.
Even more significant than the decriminalization of marijuana with respect to possession
in public, is the fact that Alaska's highest court has held that smoking and possessing mari-juana In private is a constitutionally protected right: See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 492 (Alaska
1975). The extent to which Alaskans who smoke marijuana also use homegrown marijuana
instead of buying it on the black market is unknown.
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out evident harm. However, there are two sorts of use which have
significant social costs: use by children and very heavy use. Prevent-
ing growth of either of these user populations must be a design crite-
rion for any legalization strategy.
Effective prevention of such growth would require taxation, li-
censing, and quantity restrictions similar to those described for alco-
hol, with all their associated problems.161 In particular, there would
be laws proscribing sale to minors, who now make up a large minor-
ity of marijuana users. 62 If enforcement of this law were lax, con-
sumption would grow; if it were severe, enforcement levels might not
decrease much from the current regime. Some of the details might
differ: because marijuana is so much more compact than alcohol,
marijuana leakage from adults to children and other ineligible users
could more easily take on the characteristics of illicit enterprise than
does the leakage of alcohol.16 3 Because marijuana legalization in-
volves a change in legal status, it would also have important social
effects, including the effects of use by role models. It may be that
such acceptability would make marijuana use no worse a problem
than cigarette smoking; but making the marijuana problem more
like the cigarette problem is not a desideratum.
Marijuana varies widely in its potency. The concentrations of
tetrahydrocannabinol (THG), marijuana's main active principle,
vary from less than three percent to more than ten percent. 64 There
is reason to think that the more potent product poses greater risks of
overintoxication, though less potent marijuana exposes its users to
more lung damage for the same drug experience. Marijuana users
believe the subjective effects of high potency "connoisseur" grade to
be qualitatively different from the commercial product. 65 This raises
another policy design problem. Should there be limits, beyond label-
161. See supra text accompanying notes 127-34 (discussing the problems associated
with the taxation and licensing of alcohol).
162. See YOUTH SURVEY, supra note 140; PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME,
AMERICA'S HABIT: DRUG ABUSE, DRUG TRAFFICKING, AND ORGANIZED CRIME 50 (1986)
(noting that 23 % of youths aged 16 and 17, 8 % of youths aged 14 and 15, and 2% of youths
aged 12 and 13, used marijuana at least once per month) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N].
163. Cf. Kaplan, supra note 35, at 39 (predicting the same situation arising with respect
to cocaine, which is even more accessible to minors because it has the added feature of not
leaving the "telltale aroma of smoke.").
164. See E. BRECHER & EDITORS OF CONSUMER REPORTS, LICIT AND ILLICIT DRUGS
404-05 (1972) (discussing the varying THC levels of marijuana grown within the United
States); W. NOVAK, HIGH CULTURE: MARIJUANA IN THE LIVES OF AMERICANS 177-80 (1980)
(discussing the various qualities and varieties of marijuana).
165. W. NOVAK, supra note 164, at 187-95.
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ling requirements, on marijuana potency? If so, a black market
might develop in illegal high-potency marijuana; if not, the newly
legal marijuana industry might compete to provide more potent (and
therefore possibly more psychologically dangerous) forms of the
drug. Perhaps tax rates could be adjusted to discourage very-high-
potency marijuana without flatly forbidding it.
Setting tax rates itself poses a difficult problem. Untaxed or
lightty taxed marijuana would be significantly cheaper than it is on
the current black market; a pre-rolled "joint" might cost a few cents,
like a tobacco cigarette or a tea bag. Significant increases in con-
sumption could be expected to result from such a sharp decline in
price.
Heavy taxation, however, risks the possibility that the black
market would continue to profit from selling untaxed marijuana.
Some heavy users who now pay for their marijuana from their earn-
ings as marijuana dealers might turn to property crime instead. l 6" At
best, heavy taxation would require serious enforcement efforts.
Marijuana legalization, then, has the potential to make some
things better and others worse. The magnitude of these changes
under any specific regulatory regime is a matter for further conjec-
ture and analysis; whether they add up to a good or bad trade de-
pends on what is likely to happen and on what weights are assigned
to different aspects of the problem. But the spectrum of the possible
results of marijuana legalization is much broader than some of its
proponents seem to believe. Low-tax, high-potency legal marijuana
could lead to severe social costs within user populations of the great-
est concern; high-tax, low-potency marijuana could sustain black
markets and their associated costs while increasing consumption
more modestly. Decriminalized marijuana could simultaneously lead
to lower law enforcement expenditures and increased criminal
wealth and power.
If legalizing marijuana were to lead to modest increases in
heavy drug use and drug use by minors (say ten percent), it could
reasonably be counted a success. If, instead, those levels were to
triple, and marijuana potency were to rise, it would have to be
counted as an expensive and difficult-to-reverse failure. In the ab-
sence of any quantitative estimate of the probabilities of these two
outcomes, legalizing marijuana has to be rated as a gamble, and a
166. This potentially dangerous result is more relevant to heroin or cocaine, where eco-
nomically-motivated user crime is a major feature of the current illicit market, than to
marijuana.
[Vol. 18:527
ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTION
high-stakes gamble at that.
C. Legal Cocaine?-The Pricing Paradox
More than any other drug, "crack" symbolizes the drug prob-
lem of the latter half of the 1980S.167 The smokable form of cocaine
provides a powerful but short-lived drug experience for a few dollars
per dose." 8 Its unpleasant after-effects, relieved by another pull at
the pipe, keep some users coming back for more as long as their
money holds out.6 9 The spread of violence related to crack deal-
ing 170 and of crack-related law enforcement costs has fueled the
drive for legalization. But the invention of crack makes the legaliza-
tion of cocaine a less plausible, rather than a more plausible, strat-
egy. Crack makes cocaine a drug peculiarly ill-suited to
legalization.' 7 L
In the 1970s, cocaine was quite expensive. 72 Taken intranasally
in the form of powder, the effects of a small dose were sufficiently
subtle that experienced users couldn't reliably tell whether they were
taking cocaine or a placebo in double-blind trials. 3 Its user base
was relatively small and mostly affluent. 17 4 It was possible to argue
that powder cocaine, the rich people's problem, did not merit partic-
ularly vigorous social intervention; drug use by the rich has fewer
external costs than use by the poor because rich users have private
resources with which to absorb the costs of their use.
Three things happened in the late 1970s and early 1980s to
shatter this relatively serene picture. The first was a technical inno-
167. See BENNETT PLAN, supra note 6, at 3 (noting that crack is responsible for the
intensifying drug-related "chaos"); see also supra note I and accompanying text.
168. See Morley, What Crack Is Like, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 2, 1989, at 12-13.
169. See id.
170. See, e.g., A Tide of Drug Killing, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 16, 1989, at 44-45 (attributing
the increasing murder rate within the United States to increased drug activity); Another
Bloody Year, TIME, Jan. 8, 1990, at 53 (noting that new homicide records were set in at least
seven major cities in 1989, and quoting New York Assistant Police Chief Raymond Kelly as
attributing the dramatic rise in murders to crack.).
171. See People Are Resisting, U.S. News & World Rep., Feb. 19, 1990, at 18 (Wil-
liam J. Bennett stating that legalization is "not going anywhere" because crack, which has no
maintenance dosage, simply cannot be legalized).
172. Wilson & Dilulio, supra note 31, at 22-23 (noting that cocaine in its powdered
form was relatively expensive and used mainly by the affluent until the introduction of low
priced crack which has greatly increased use in all segments of society); see also PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N, supra note 162, at 15 (noting that while cocaine was once considered a drug for the
wealthy, it is now used by individuals of all socioeconomic groups).
173. Van Dyke & Byck, Cocaine, 246 Sci. Am. 128, 139 (1982).
174. Wilson & Dilulio, supra note 31, at 22.
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vation. Users learned how to "freebase"-to convert cocaine to a
smokable form-which gave a far more intense and short-lived drug
experience. 175 The second was a marketing innovation. Dealers
learned to do the conversion from powder to "base" and to package
single-dose units as "crack.' 116 The third was a collapse in black-
market prices, due in part to a concentration of federal enforcement
resources on markedly ineffective interdiction efforts17 7 and in part
to the failure of the overall enforcement effort to grow fast enough to
keep pace with the growing market. These three transformations
spread the use of cocaine down the socioeconomic spectrum and
across the country.
Economist Milton Friedman has suggested that the invention of
crack was a consequence of the illegality of cocaine.' 78 But there is
no reason to think that the diffusion of new technology would have
been slower, or the price collapse less precipitous, in a legal market;
the converse is actually more plausible.179
Legalizing cocaine in a world where it will be converted to
crack has costs and benefits very different from legalizing cocaine
that will be snorted as powder. The potential benefits are great, since
the illegality of crack is clearly responsible for many of its most sig-
nificant costs. Crack dealers trade gunshots on the streets of numer-
ous urban neighborhoods. 80 Crack dealing is also a lucrative busi-
ness, able to offer financial opportunity in areas where little licit
opportunity exists.' 8' Turning crack into a regulated and legal com-
175. See COCAINE: A CLINICIAN'S HANDBOOK 176-77 (A. Washton & M. Gold eds.
1987) (providing an historical background to the development of free-basing cocaine within
the United States) [hereinafter COCAINE]; J. BAKALAR & L. GRINSPOON, supra note 36, at
279-81.
176. See COCAINE, supra note 175, at 177 (observing that the emergence of crack "re-
present[ed] a new strategy in the sale and marketing of street cocaine".).
177. See generally REUTER, CRAWFORD, & CAVE, SEALING THE BORDERS: THE EFFECTS
OF INCREASED MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN DRUG INTERDICTION (1988) (analyzing the conse-
quences of heightened military involvement in drug interdiction efforts and discussing the ef-
fects of such involvement on marijuana and cocaine use).
178. Friedman, supra note 13, at A16, col. 3-4 (arguing that cocaine's prohibited status
contributed to its high cost and that "'crack' . . . was invented because the high cost of illegal
drugs made it profitable to provide a cheaper version.").
179. See Kleiman, Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1989, at A15, col. 2 (letter to the editor stating
that "[ec]rack ... was not invented by or for poor users looking for a cheaper substitute, but
by rich cocaine users looking for a more intense drug experience.").
180. Wilson & Dilulio, supra note 31, at 21 (citing Los Angeles, Newark, Chicago,
New York City, and Washington D.C., and comparing the violent conditions in the cities to
"Beirut on a bad day."); see also supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
181. See T. WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 8 (reporting that "[m]any teenagers are drawn
to work in the cocaine trade simply because they want jobs, full time or even as casual la-
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modity would separate economically-motivated lawlessness from the
demand for an inexpensive high. The illegal crack-distribution indus-
try would shrink, much to the relief of neighborhoods now held cap-
tive by street drug markets.'82 Youth gangs and criminal groups
would lose influence. Removing the financial incentives the crack
business offers youth would help restore families and schools.
The question still remains, however: what would happen to con-
sumption and to the death, damage and crime caused by the drug
itself? Crack did not become popular because it was illegal. It is
popular because the demand for the cheap, intense high that it pro-
vides is great, especially, perhaps, in poor, urban areas. 83 Specula-
tion about why this should be-lack of financial opportunity, single-
parent families, racism' 84-- does not change this fact.
Many of the effects of crack remain unclear; its recent develop-
ment means that available knowledge is scanty and unreliable, and
unusually dependent on investigations by the popular press. How-
ever, a number of factors suggest that the costs of legalization in the
form of increased drug abuse might be substantial.
The crack-using population is much smaller than the mari-
juana-using one; there are still many areas where crack is relatively
difficult to get, although it is becoming more widely available. There
is thus more to lose from legalizing crack than from legalizing mari-
juana, in terms of the number of people to whom the drug would
become newly available.
Crack generates compulsive use very differently from depres-
sants like heroin and alcohol. It has been estimated that one crack
bor-the drug business is a 'safety net' of sorts, a place where it is always possible to make a
few dollars."); Massing, Crack's Destructive Sprint Across America, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1,
1989, § 6 (Magazine), at 8, col. 1 (DEA agent explaining that it is very easy to become a
crack entrepreneur, because "[fQor a small investment you can buy some cocaine, convert it to
crack in the kitchen and begin distributing.").
182. See supra note 3.
183. See Morley, supra note 168, at 12-13 (commenting that crack is "attractive to the
poor, and wildly popular among those who had no prayer of ever achieving that comfortable
station in life [because crack is like a drug that can] ... chemically induce feelings of upper-
middle-classness.").
184. Although crack use does not appear to correlate with race, the perception of the
"crack problem" often has strong racial overtones. See e.g., Fitzgerald supra note 49, at 19
(commenting that New York state's substance-abuse agency estimates that 400,000 New
Yorkers used illegal drugs on a weekly basis in 1987, and that while two thirds of this frequent
user group were whites, 91 % of the drug related state prison convictions were Blacks or His-
panics); France, supra note I, at 44 (noting that "inner city minorities have suffered the most




user in six becomes a repeat binge user. 185 This ratio is about as bad
as it could be; high enough to mean that widespread use will gener-
ate widespread destruction, but low enough to seem a risk worth tak-
ing to many adolescents.
The harm done by crack use is orders of magnitude greater
than that done by marijuana. Crack is a much more potent
psychoactive. It does its users significant physiological damage, and
is especially debilitating to fetuses in utero.188 The psychological ef-
fects of the drug are strong enough to detach many users from their
neighborhoods, jobs, schools and families. Long-term use may lead
to a particularly anti-social condition known as "stimulant psycho-
sis," characterized by aggressive behavior. 8"
Nor is it clear that, on balance, legalization would even de-
crease predatory crime. Surely, crime by dealers would fall, but
crime by users is another story. If the legal price were high (near the
current black-market price of five dollars per dose) and increased
availability led to a substantial increase in the number of compulsive
users, the result presumably would be an increase in income-produc-
ing crime to pay for crack, with licensed sellers replacing street deal-
ers as the recipients of the proceeds of burglary. This would be com-
pounded by the fact that those crack users who now support their
habits by dealing would find themselves out of business and in need
of a new income source.
If, on the other hand, the legal price were low (near the phar-
maceutical price of five dollars per gram, or about twenty-five cents
per dose) one can only imagine the resulting increase in drug abuse
damage and in pharmacologically-generated violent crime. Perhaps
user licensure and quantity restrictions could limit the health costs of
a low-tax legalization regime. However, it is hard to imagine how
they would do so, given the strong compulsion generated by crack in
some of its users, without simply re-creating the current black mar-
ket with an expanded customer base created by legal
experimentation.
In sum, now that crack is here, neither high-tax legal cocaine
185. See Raise Cigarette Prices, Save Lives, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1989, at A16, col. 1.
186. BENNErr PLAN, supra note 6, at 44 (estimating that 100,000 "cocaine babies" are
born each year); Zuckerman, Frank, Hingson, Amara, Levenson, Kayne, Parker, Vinci,
Aboagyc, Fried, Cagral, Timperi & Bauchner, Effects of Maternal Marijuana and Cocaine
Use on Fetal Growth, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 762 (1989) (discussing the effects on infants of
cocaine and marijuana use during pregnancy); see French, supra note 4, at B1, col. 4.
187. See Estroff, Medical and Biological Consequences of Cocaine Abuse, in COCAINE,
supra note 175, at 28-29.
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nor low-tax cocaine would be likely to leave us with a smaller co-
caine problem than we now have. Thus, abandoning cocaine prohibi-
tion is unattractive, and attention should instead be focused on ways
to make the enforcement of that prohibition less costly and more
effective.
V. LEGALIZATION AND DRUG ABUSE CONTROL
This Article's central argument, that the costs imposed by mar-
kets in licit psychoactives are significantly greater than those im-
posed by drug prohibition, is a policy analysis. Its consequentialist
approach is unlikely to sway those-either libertarians who laud
drug legalization in the name of liberty or "cultural conservatives"
who decry it in the name of morals-who appeal to principles rather
than consequences.
But even as libertarians and "cultural conservatives" reject the
terms of consequentialism, those who accept the calculus of costs
and benefits would do well to consider whether the debate over legal-
ization is itself well framed. The pragmatic question about drug con-
trol policy is how to manage the availability of a wide range of ex-
isting and potential psychoactives to get the best mix of cost and
benefits. Changing drugs' legal status is only one of many possible
interventions which can effect that mix. Less dramatic proposals,
which offer the potential of real progress with minimal risks, deserve
at least equal attention.
Without changing the legal status of alcohol, we could create a
new regulatory regime to make it less widely abused and responsible
for less crime. 88 Without changing the legal status of marijuana, we
could reduce enforcement costs greatly with little or no increase in
abuse. Changing the legal status of cocaine and crack seems ill-ad-
vised, but that does not imply that current enforcement practices
could not use dramatic reform.
The challenge of drug policy is to find least-cost solutions to the
problems created by the age-old fact that some human beings take
more of various mind-altering substances than is good for them or
their neighbors, and by the modern fact that the variety of available
psychoactives is rapidly increasing. To concentrate on changing la-
bels from "legal" to "illegal" is to miss all of the hard work and
most of the social importance that accompanies that challenge.
188. See supra notes 105-34 and accompanying text.
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